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Abstract 
As a general rule, if one party commits a repudiatory breach, the other party can then terminate the 
contract.  
Therefore, if one partner commits a repudiatory breach of the partnership agreement, it might be 
expected that the partnership could be terminated — under general law principles.  
That, however, is not necessarily what happens — and the approaches of the UK and the Australian 
courts differ considerably. 
The UK courts have generally followed Lord Millett’s approach in Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 — 
holding that the doctrine of accepted repudiation cannot apply to partnerships.  
Although his reasoning on that point was clearly obiter, the remainder of the court did not disagree 
with it and it was subsequently adopted in both Mullins v Laughton [2003] Ch 250 and Golstein v Bishop 
[2014] Ch 455. 
In Australia, the courts have taken the opposite view, holding that partnerships can be dissolved by 
repudiatory breach — though none of the cases to date have been finally decided on that basis.  
In Johnson v Snaddon [1999] VSC 243 Coldrey J accepted the possibility, but then held that, on the 
facts, there had been no repudiation.  
In Ryder v Frohlich [2004] NSWCA 472 McColl JA (with whom the other members of the court agreed) 
found that, while there had been a repudiation, there had also been an abandonment — and that was 
enough to terminate the agreement. The same applied in Walker v Melham [2007] NSWSC 264.  
Subsequent decisions (Fazio v Fazio [2012] WASCA 72,  Bonzalie v Cullu [2013] NSWSC 1576, Letizia 
Building Co Pty Ltd v Redglow Asset Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 171 and Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd 
[2019] 1 Qd R 107) have used similarly equivocal reasoning — though all seem to have preferred McColl 
JA's approach to that of Lord Millett.  
This paper considers the differences between the two approaches and asks the question: in the end 
result, does it really matter? 
 
Introduction 
The Doctrine of Accepted Repudiation 
What is It? 
If one party repudiates a contract the other may accept the repudiaton and immediately bring the 
contract to an end. As the High Court of Australia put it in Shevill v Builders Licensing Board, the 
innocent party ‘is entitled to accept the repudiation, thereby discharging himself from further 
performance, and may sue for damages’.1  
                                                            
1 (1982) 149 CLR 620 at 625-26. 
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Discharge occurs at the point at which the acceptance of the other party’s repudiation occurs and the 
consequences are as Dixon J described them in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd: 
… the contract is not rescinded as from the beginning. Both parties are discharged from the further 
performance of the contract, but rights are not divested or discharged which have already been 
unconditionally acquired. Rights and obligations which arise from the partial execution of the 
contract and causes of action which have accrued from its breach alike continue unaffected2 
(emphasis added). 
Justifying the Doctrine 
The doctrine of repudiatory breach is largely an exercise in pragmatism. It allows parties to bring an 
end to contracts that will clearly not be performed, and to seek immediate relief, without having to 
wait for an actual breach. As Lord Keith of Kinkel put it in Woodar Investment Development Ltd v 
Wimpey Construction UK Ltd: 
 The doctrine of repudiatory breach is largely founded on considerations of convenience and the 
opportunities which it affords for mitigating loss, as observed by Lord Cockburn in Frost v Knight 
[(1872) LR 7 Exch 111 at 114]. It enables one party to a contract, when faced with a clear 
indication by the other that he does not intend to perform his obligations under it when the time 
for performance arrives, to treat the contract, if he so chooses, as there and then at an end and 
to claim damages as for actual breach.3 
The Principles Underlying the Doctrine 
The principles underlying the doctrine were summarised by Finn J in GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v 
BHP Technology Pty Ltd,4 saying: 
(i)  A party will have repudiated a contract if, by words or conduct, it evinces an intention no 
longer to be bound by it or if that party shows it intends to fulfil the contract only in a manner 
substantially inconsistent with its obligations and not in any other way: Shevill v Builders 
Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620 at 625-626; Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping 
Centre Pty Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 623. 
(ii)  The party’s conduct is to be judged objectively by reference to the effect it would be 
reasonably calculated to have upon a reasonable person: Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park 
Shopping Centre Pty Ltd at 658; Satellite Estate Pty Ltd v Jaquet (1968) 71 SR (NSW) 126 at 
150.5  
(iii)  A party that acts on a genuine but erroneous view of its obligations under the contract will 
not for that reason alone have repudiated it. That party may still be willing to perform the 
contract according to its tenor; to recognise its heresy; or to accept an authoritative 
exposition of the contract: DTR Nominees Pty Ltd v Mona Homes Pty Ltd (1978) 138 CLR 423 
at 431-432; Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 
                                                            
2 (1933) 48 CLR at 476-77. Lord Millett noted in Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 at 193 that ‘This passage has been 
expressly approved by your Lordships’ House’ (citing Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 at 396, per Lord 
Wilberforce, and Colonial Bank v European Grain and Shipping Ltd [1989] AC 1056 at 1098-99). 
3 [1980] 1 All ER 571 at 588. See also McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR at 476-77. 
4 (2003) 128 FCR 1 at [889]-[891]. 
5 Whether a party’s conduct meets that requirement is determined by examining ‘the conduct, whether verbal 
or other, of the party in default which conveys to the other party the defaulting party’s inability to perform the 
contract or promise or his intention not to perform it or to fulfil it only in a manner substantially inconsistent 
with his obligations and not in any other way’: Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK 
Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571 at 586 per Lord Keith of Kinkel citing Freeth v Burr (1874) LR 9 CP 208 at 213, Johnstone 
v Milling (1886) LR 16 QBD 460 at 474, Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor, Benzon & Co (1884) 9 App Cas 434 at 
438-39 and James Shaffer Ltd v Findlay Durham & Brodie[1953] 1 WLR 106 at 116. 
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WLR 277.6 But persistence in an untenable construction will ordinarily be regarded as 
repudiatory: Summers v Commonwealth (1918) 25 CLR 144 at 152; and see Chitty on 
Contracts, vol 1, para 25-018. 
As the references that Finn J cited in support of those propositions demonstrate, the same underlying 
principles also apply in the courts of England and Wales. 
Other (or allied) principles that the courts have applied include: 
a. repudiation ‘is a serious matter and is not to be lightly found or inferred’;7 
b. in considering whether a contract has, in fact, been repudiated, all the circumstances of the 
case must be considered to determine whether the conduct alleged to be repudiatory 
‘amounts to a renunciation, to an absolute refusal to perform the contract;’8 
c. ‘in general, an unwarranted termination of a contract in consequence of a purported 
acceptance of what is wrongly claimed to be repudiation will be regarded as repudiation by 
the person giving the notice of termination [though that may] not necessarily … be so in all 
cases and in all circumstances’.9 Therefore, as Neuberger noted in Mullins v Laughton, it may 
be that ‘an innocent party who purports to accept a repudiatory breach would often not be 
certain as to whether or not the partnership had been brought to an end until the court 
decides on the issue of whether the breach was in fact repudiatory’.10  
Therefore, the essence of the applicable principles is that whether one person’s conduct amounts to 
a repudiation which can be ‘accepted’ by the other to terminate the contract depends, to a very large 
extent, on a consideration of the entirety of what was said and done and the context in which that 
occurred, with the overriding consideration that repudiation is not to be ‘lightly found or inferred’. 
 Restrictions on its General Application 
There are at least two restrictions on the accepted repudiation doctrine. First, a party cannot 
terminate a contract for the other’s repudiation unless he or she was ready, willing and able to 
perform at the point of acceptance,11 or has had performance waived (though, as Mason CJ put it in 
Foran v Wright ‘[i]n the case of an anticipatory renunciation accepted by the plaintiff, the requirement 
of readiness and willingness extends only up to the time of acceptance because then the earlier 
repudiation results in an early termination of the contract’12).   
                                                            
6 See also Ross T Smyth & Co Ltd v TD Bailey Son & Co (1940) 3 All ER 60 at 72. If that occurs the ‘innocent’ party 
should try to show the ‘repudiating’ party that he or she is mistaken before relying on the conduct as a 
repudiation of the contract: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd v Universal News Services Ltd [1964] 2 QB 699 at 734. 
7 Shevill v Builders Licensing Board (1982) 149 CLR 620 at 629 per Wilson J and at 633 per Ashley JA (citing Ross 
T Smyth & Co Ltd v TD Bailey Son & Co (1940) 3 All ER 60 at 71). See also Woodar Investment Development Ltd v 
Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571 at 576 per Lord Wilberforce and at 583 per Lord Russell of 
Killowen and Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 17 at 32 per Mason J.  
8 Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor, Benzon & Co (1884) 9 App Cas 434 at 439. See also Shevill v Builders Licensing 
Board (1982) 149 CLR 620 at 633 per Ashley JA. 
9 Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 at 453. 
10 Mullins v Laughton [2003] Ch 250 at [92]. 
11 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Dartbrook Coal (Sales) Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 115 at [64] per Kiefel J, citing 
Hensley v Reschke (1914) 18 CLR 452 at 131 and Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (Australasia) 
Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235 at 253 (which, in turn, cited Jones v Barkley (1781) 2 Doug 684; 9 ER 434, Ripley v 
M’Clure (1849) 4 Ex 345; 154 ER 1245; Cort v Ambergate &c Railway Co (1851) 17 QB 127; 117 ER 1229 and Byrne 
v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344). See also Foran v Wright (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 408-09 per Mason CJ. Being 
ready and willing to perform also imports an ability to perform: De Medina v Norman (1842) 9 M&W 820 at 827, 
152 ER 347 at 350 and Peter Turnbull & Co Pty Ltd v Mundus Trading Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1954) 90 CLR 235 
at 253. 
12 (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 408 per Mason CJ. 
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Secondly, if a party does elect to terminate, that election must be by clear and unequivocal words or 
conduct that evinces that election. That is because, as Asquith LJ put it in Howard v Pickford Tool Co 
Ltd, ‘an unaccepted repudiation is a thing writ in water and of no value to anybody: it confers no legal 
rights of any sort or kind'.13 Therefore, as his Lordship went on to note, ‘a declaration that the 
defendants had repudiated their contract with the plaintiff would be entirely valueless to the plaintiff 
if it … was not accepted’.14 
To be effective the acceptance must also be communicated, or otherwise made plain to the 
repudiating party, through either words or conduct, so that that party becomes aware that, because 
of their wrongful action, the innocent party is treating the contract as at an end.15 No specific form of 
communication is required but the innocent party must make it unequivocally clear that he or she is 
treating the contract as at an end.16   
Conduct evidencing an election to accept a repudiation and terminate the contract could include 
making alternative contractual arrangements with another party (as was the case in Holland v 
Wiltshire17) though, in appropriate cases, it could even be simple inaction — as was the case in Vitol 
SA v Norelf Ltd18 where the plaintiff’s failure to perform its part of the contract (by not trying to deliver 
the cargo to the defendant following the defendant’s repudiation) was held to be a clear and 
unequivocal election to treat the contract as at an end.  
Application of the Doctrine to Partnerships 
Because partnerships involve a contractual relationship between the parties, it might be thought that 
if a partner commits a serious breach of the partnership agreement (that is, either a fundamental 
breach or a breach of one of its express or implied conditions) or if they otherwise renounce their 
obligations under the contract, and if the other partner/s accept that repudiation, the partnership 
would automatically terminate under general law principles. Unfortunately, there is considerable 
doubt about whether the general law contractual doctrine of ‘accepted repudiation’ applies to 
partnerships, at least as a means of automatic dissolution. 
The Decision in Hurst v Bryk 
The matter was discussed in some detail by Lord Millett in Hurst v Bryk,19 even though that question 
was not, in fact, relevant to his decision in that case – for two reasons.  
First, both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal had proceeded on the basis that an 
accepted repudiation could automatically terminate a partnership20 and, as his Lordship 
acknowledged, because the accuracy of that assumption had not been raised on appeal, it was not 
something that the House of Lords had to consider.21  
Secondly, (and in any case) the plaintiff’s action was based on a misconception of the basis on which 
partners are liable for the debts and other obligations of their firm.  
Hurst had argued that his exit from the (already doomed) partnership was the result of him accepting 
what he argued was the repudiation by all of his fellow partners of their partnership agreement — a 
                                                            
13 [1951] 1 KB 417 at 421 (cited with approval by Stevenson J in Network Ten Pty Ltd v Seven Network 
(Operations) Ltd [2014] NSWSC 692 at [137]). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Heymans v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 at 361 per Viscount Simon LC; Ryder v Frohlich [2004] NSWCA 472 at 
[117]-[119]; State of New South Wales v Shaw (2015) 97 NSWLR 169 at [186]. 
16 Lakshmijit v Sherani [1974] AC 605 at 616; Ryder v Frohlich [2004] NSWCA 472 at [117]-[118]; State of New 
South Wales v Shaw (2015) 97 NSWLR 169 at [186]. 
17 (1954) 90 CLR 409. 
18 [1996] AC 800. 
19 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 193–95. 
20 Hurst v Bryk [1999] Ch 1 at 9. 
21 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 196. 
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repudiation effected by them entering into an agreement (the ‘dissolution agreement’ which he had 
refused to sign) to bring about an earlier dissolution than that to which they had already agreed (ie 
bringing it forward from 31 May 1991 to 31 October 1990 because they all agreed that it was not 
practically possible to continue with their partnership until the later date).  
This, Hurst said, meant that ‘as between himself and his fellow partners, he [was] discharged from all 
further performance of those obligations which he undertook by becoming a partner, and these 
include[d] the obligation to contribute to the firm’s losses’22 — an obligation which, clearly, would 
have attached to him if the partnership had been dissolved in any of the ways provided for in the 
Partnership Act 1890 (UK).23      
However, as Lord Millett pointed out, Hurst’s argument fundamentally misconstrued the legal 
position.24 Even if Hurst’s acceptance of his fellow partners’ ‘repudiatory breach’ had brought the 
partnership agreement to an end that merely excused both parties from further performance of its 
terms; it did not affect the firm’s creditors. Under the terms of the Partnership Act, they could ‘still 
recover judgment against the firm and execute against any of the partners separately’.25  In the 
absence of an indemnity from his fellow partners, Hurst could not avoid his liability for the firm’s 
debts. 
What his acceptance of the ‘repudiation’ might have done was to entitle Hurst to damages for breach 
of contract — but they could not ‘be measured by the contribution he must make to the accrued and 
continuing liabilities of the firm pending the completion of the winding up. [That] liability to contribute 
… had accrued before any breach of the partnership agreement occurred and has in no sense been 
caused by his partners’ breach of contract’.26 
In other words, because the liabilities that Hurst sought to avoid were incurred (or assumed) by the 
firm while he was still a partner, he was liable for them27 and that liability, both before and after 
dissolution, had to be taken into account when determining his share of the firm’s profits and losses 
under s 44 — an outcome not affected by the termination of the partnership, whether for accepted 
repudiation or otherwise. 
For both reasons, while Lord Millett opined at some length on whether the doctrine could apply to 
contracts of partnership, he did not base his decision on any concluded view of the matter, noting 
instead: ‘In these circumstances I am content to proceed on the basis of the same assumption [as the 
courts below] while reserving for future consideration the question whether it is correct.’28 
Against that background though, his Lordship’s view, with which none of the remainder of the court 
disagreed, was that ‘accepted repudiation’ does not terminate the partnership relationship, though it 
does terminate the partnership contract (although Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead expressly stated, in 
relation to the question of the applicability of the doctrine of accepted repudiation to partnerships, 
that ‘I, too, prefer to keep open for another occasion the question whether a partnership can be 
                                                            
22 Ibid at 198. 
23 While dissolution by agreement is not specifically provided for under the Partnership Act it is, as Lord Millettt 
noted at 195, ‘catered for by section 19 [the ‘variation’ power] taken in conjunction with section 32(a) 
[dissolution of a fixed term partnership by expiration of the fixed term]’. In Chahal v Mahal [2005] 2 BCLC 655 
at [21] Neuberger J also noted that ‘it may be that determination by agreement is actually covered by the 
opening words of s 32, rather than by the more indirect way identified by Lord Millett’. 
24 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 198-99. 
25 Ibid at 198. 
26 Ibid at 199. 
27 Partnership Act 1890 (UK) s 9. 
28 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 196. 
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automatically dissolved by an innocent partner or partners treating the other partner’s or partners’ 
breach as repudiatory’29).  
Lord Millett explained his reasoning saying: 
Repudiation as a ground of dissolution first saw the light of day in Hitchman v Crouch Butler Savage 
Associates (1982) 80 LS Gaz 550, where Harman J treated as axiomatic the proposition that the 
doctrine of repudiatory breach applies to partnership agreements as it applies to other contracts. 
The question, however, is not whether the doctrine applies to the contract of partnership, but 
whether it operates to bring about the automatic dissolution of the partnership relationship.30 
That reasoning was based on the fact that a partnership is more than a mere contract. As his Lordship 
noted, ‘it is more than a simple contract; … it is a continuing personal as well as commercial 
relationship’31 — and it is heavily governed by both the express provisions of the Partnership Acts and 
equitable principles. As a result ‘[d]isputes between partners and the dissolution and winding up of 
partnerships … have always fallen within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery’.32 Therefore, he 
argued:  
By entering into the relationship of partnership, the parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction 
of the court of equity and the general principles developed by that court in the exercise of its 
equitable jurisdiction in respect of partnerships.33 
That being the case, he saw three reasons why the doctrine of accepted repudiation could not apply 
to partnerships.  
First, the Partnership Acts expressly state the circumstances in which a partnership is (or can be) 
dissolved (those set out in ss 32-35 of the Partnership Act 1890 (UK)), and there is nothing in that Act 
that refers either directly or indirectly to acceptance of repudiatory breach of contract being one of 
those grounds. 
Secondly, if the courts were to accept that acceptance of repudiatory breach was an additional ground 
for automatic dissolution, it would be difficult to see how it might apply in practice where there were 
more than two partners and one of them, who was not guilty of repudiatory breach, refused to accept 
the repudiation. In such cases it could be argued that the partnership between the partner who 
repudiated and those who accepted that repudiation would thereby automatically come to an end, 
but that the partnership between that partner and those who refused to accept it would remain on 
foot. The consequence would be that an application to the court for dissolution would still be needed 
to bring that partnership to an end (presumably on the 'wilful or persistent breach' ground, because 
                                                            
29 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 189. 
30 Ibid at 195. 
31 Ibid at 194. 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid at 196. This passage was cited by Southin JA in Brew v Rozano Holdings Ltd 2006 BCCA 346 at [22] to 
support her view (at [23]) ‘that Lord Millett is essentially right for this reason: Partners owe each other a duty 
which is, in my opinion, is not created by s 22(1), but was also a principle of good faith’. (Section 22(1) of the 
Partnership Act 1996 (BC), which has no equivalent in the Partnership Act 1890 (UK), imposes a statutory duty 
on partners to ‘act with the utmost fairness and good faith towards the other members of the firm in the 
business of the firm’). Her Honour did not entirely support Lord Millett’s views, instead adopting a middle course 
which would seem to allow partnerships to be terminated by accepted repudiation, subject to the qualification 
that, in accepting the repudiatory conduct the innocent party must have acted in ‘utmost good faith’ (see [24]-
[26]). (What her Honour actually said (at [3]) was that the doctrine would apply ‘if at all, only in limited 
circumstances’ ─ without explaining what those circumstances might be. However, she clearly failed to find any 
that would justify the purported termination that had taken place in that case ─ though she also found, at [27], 
that: ‘If there ever were a case for a dissolution under the just and equitable provision, this was it. The 
partnership was not going to work’). See also Greg Dowling Architects Inc v J Raymond Griffin Architect Inc 2012 
BCCA 366 at [31]-[36] and Ning v Li 2017 BCCA 156 at [11].   
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any such breach would clearly be repudiatory). As his Lordship then noted '[t]his would lead to a very 
odd distinction between those (few) cases where dissolution was automatic and those cases where it 
was not'.34  
The third, and in Lord Millett's view the strongest argument against admitting accepted repudiation 
as a further ground for automatic dissolution, was that ‘it would circumvent the discretionary power 
of the court under [the wilful or persistent breach provision in s 35(d)]’. Noting that, ‘even where the 
plaintiff establishes conduct … which comes within [that section], the court is not bound to order a 
dissolution’ (emphasis added), he went on to say that:  
… there is much to be said for the view that [by entering into a partnership] they [the partners] 
thereby renounce their right by unilateral action to bring about the automatic dissolution of their 
relationship by acceptance of a repudiatory breach of the partnership contract, and instead submit 
the question to the discretion of the court (emphasis added).35 
Those comments were, however, clearly obiter and, as Lord Millett expressly left the point undecided, 
it was left to subsequent courts to decide whether or not they should apply his Lordship’s reasoning. 
UK Decisions after Hurst v Bryk 
Nearly all UK decisions after Hurst v Bryk approved Lord Millett’s views36 — though, tellingly, none of 
them relied on the suggested principle as the legal basis for their decisions. 
The first was Mullins v Laughton,37 where, ‘on the basis of the written material, and the brief oral 
argument on the topic’38 Neuberger J held that the partnership there in question could not be 
automatically dissolved by the claimant simply accepting the defendants’ repudiatory breach — 
although, perhaps in deference to the obiter nature of Lord Millett’s views and the existence of 
contrary views in other decisions,39 he did not base his decision on accepted repudiation not being 
available as a way of dissolving a partnership. Instead, he noted that:  
… on the issue of repudiation, I conclude, as a matter of law, that BKR could not have been dissolved 
by an accepted repudiation, but, if that is wrong, the conduct of [the defendants] was such that 
there would have been a repudiatory breach, which has been accepted by Mr Mullins, and which 
would therefore have led to dissolution of the partnership. Effectively, by their words and their 
                                                            
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. See also Southin JA in Brew v Rozano Holdings Ltd 2006 BCCA 346 at [22]. Lord Millett followed this 
passage with the words, ‘For a similar principle in a different contractual context, see Johnson v Agnew [1980] 
AC 367, 399, per Lord Wilberforce’. With respect this is a difficult analogy to accept. That case involved a matter 
in which an order for specific performance of a contract had been made and, when it was not complied with, 
the vendors sold the properties (for a lesser price) and sued for damages. Lord Wilberforce’s comment that 
‘[o]nce the matter has been placed in the hands of a court of equity, or one exercising equity jurisdiction, the 
subsequent control of the matter will be exercised according to equitable principles’ was made in that context, 
not in the context of a situation where the parties had not submitted a dispute to the jurisdiction of a court of 
equity but were simply in a relationship which involved, inter alia, equitable obligations. 
36 The one notable exception was the decision in Lie v Mohile [2015] EWHC 200 (Ch) where Justice Birss, relying 
on the Court of Appeal decision in Hurst v Bryk and not citing the House of Lords decision at all, seemed to 
proceed on the basis that acceptance of repudiatory breach could bring partnerships to an end: see at [21]. The 
judgment also rather inexplicably references Golstein v Bishop at [32] without noting Briggs LJ’s acceptance of 
Lord Millett’s views.   
37 [2003] Ch 250. 
38 Ibid at [93]. 
39 See, especially, Hitchman v Crouch Butler Savage Associates (1982) 80 LS Gaz 550 per Harman J (referred to 
by Lord Millett in Hurst v Bryk) and, to a lesser extent, Fullwell v Bragg (1983) 127 SJ 171 per Nourse J (appeal 
allowed on other grounds). 
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conduct, the defendants were evincing a clear intention not to be bound by the partnership 
agreement, at least as far as Mr Mullins was concerned’ (emphasis added).40   
His Honour then went on to note that, in any case, the defendants’ conduct towards Mullins was such 
that it was appropriate to dissolve the partnership on each the statutory grounds on which Mullins 
had relied41 (after he refused to resign, they purported to treat him as if he were no longer a partner 
without following the expulsion process required by their partnership agreement). However, having 
decided to dissolve the partnership, either because of accepted repudiation or on s 35 grounds, he 
then chose not to order a winding up because, in all the circumstances, he did not think ‘that it would 
be right to wind up the partnership’.42 Instead he concluded that a Syers v Syers order,43 requiring the 
other partners to buy Mullins out, would be preferable, so long as that did not produce a worse result 
for Hurst than a formal winding up.44 
In the end result, therefore, Neuberger J, while clearly approving what he saw to be the thrust of Lord 
Millett’s ‘characteristically thorough and careful analysis’45 of the question did not base his decision 
on his acceptance of those views.   
A similar approach was adopted in Golstein v Bishop46 where, after saying that 'this appeal is not about 
deciding … whether repudiation has any place in the context of dissolution of partnerships … [nor] … 
whether there is any exception to Lord Millett’s analysis, in the case of a two partner firm, where some 
but by no means all his objections to the recognition of dissolution by accepted repudiation fall 
away',47 Briggs LJ (with whom Sullivan and Maurice Kay LJJ agreed) then went on to note ‘[m]y own 
view that Lord Millett, Neuberger J and the [trial] judge were all correct'.48 (Consistent with the views 
expressed in Hurst v Bryk and Mullins v Laughton, the trial judge in Golstein v Bishop had held that 
partnerships could not be terminated by acceptance of repudiatory breach49). His Lordship’s view was 
however substantially qualified by his acknowledgement that his own view ‘adds nothing of 
substance, since the point was not subjected to any adversarial argument in this court’.50  
His comments on the correctness of Lord Millett’s views must also be seen in the light of the fact that 
he finally disposed of the matter before him by finding that the partnership in question, which the 
trial judge had held had come to an end by mutual agreement (so termination by accepted repudiation 
was not really in issue), could equally have been terminated on the 'wilful or persistent breach' ground 
— because of the defendant's wrongful behaviour. 
Therefore, once again, although the decision does, on its surface, confer strong support for the view 
that accepted repudiation is not a basis on which partnerships can be terminated, it is not binding 
authority for the proposition, particularly, as was also the case with both Hurst v Bryk and Mullins v 
Laughton, the proposition was not subject to any substantive ‘adversarial argument’. 
There have only been two other UK decisions in which Lord Millett’s views on the question of accepted 
repudiation in the context of partnerships have been cited and neither have advanced the question 
to any appreciable extent.  
                                                            
40 Mullins v Laughton [2003] Ch 250 at [103].  
41 Partnership Act 1980 (UK) ss 35(d) (willful or persistent breach rendering it ‘not reasonably practicable’ to 
carry on the business of the partnership) and 35(f) (the ‘just and equitable’ ground). See at [104]-[106]. 
42 [2003] Ch 250 at [107]. 
43 Syers v Syers (1876) 1 App Cas 174. 
44 [2003] Ch 250 at [107]. 
45 Ibid at [93].  
46 [2014] Ch 455. 
47 ibid at [9]. 
48 Ibid at [10]. 
49 [2014] Ch 131 at [117]-[118]. 
50 [2014] Ch 455 at [10]. 
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In the first, Khurll v Poulter, Mr D Young QC sitting as a Deputy Judge in the Chancery Division found 
that the partnership there in question had not been repudiated and, while noting that Lord Millett’s 
speech ‘has since been adopted by Neuberger J in Mullins v Laughton … where it was held that as a 
matter of law, a partnership could not be dissolved by an accepted repudiation’ he went on to note 
that ‘[i]n the light of the above findings it is not necessary for me to decide this important question’.51 
In the second, Barber v Rasco International Ltd52 Judge Anthony Thornton QC sitting as a Judge of the 
Queens Bench Division, after referring to Lord Millett’s judgment, noted: 
It follows that the authority of the Court of Appeal's decision in Hurst that a partnership agreement 
can be repudiated by a partner and that that repudiation can be accepted by another partner with 
the effect that the partnership is dissolved has been severely dented, if not removed, by the 
decision and reasoning in the same case. This was the view of Neuberger J in Mullins v Laughton 
and others where he concluded:  
"93. While the point is plainly difficult, I have reached the conclusion that, on the basis of the 
written material and the brief oral argument on the topic, Lord Millett’s provisional view 
should prevail." 
I am clear that I should follow and apply the views of Lord Millet and Neuberger J and should 
conclude that in this three-partner partnership, there is no scope for the partnership to be 
dissolved by the acceptance by Mr Rassouli of the repudiatory conduct of Mr Barber and Mr Jangra 
even if such conduct had occurred (emphasis added).53  
However, in the end result his acceptance of those views was not relevant to his Honour’s ultimate 
decision. Instead, he found that the partnership had not been dissolved on any of the pleaded grounds 
because, as a partnership for both a single venture and a fixed term, it was not terminable by notice, 
the partnership agreement did not contain an express or implied power to terminate, there was no 
evidence that an agreement to terminate could be inferred and, in the case of any accepted 
repudiation, ‘it was not terminated by it having been repudiated and there was no evidence that any 
repudiation had been accepted’ (emphasis added).54 
Therefore, Lord Millett’s views on the question were, once again, not relevant to the ultimate decision. 
Consequently, the case, while supporting those views, is, again, not authority for their general 
adoption. 
Flanaghan v Liontrust Investment Partners LLP also contains one further very brief reference to Lord 
Millett having ‘provisionally decided that the doctrine … could not apply to partnership agreements’55 
but, given that the entity in question there was an LLP, that reference was, again, not relevant to the 
ultimate decision that ‘the doctrine is implicitly excluded in relation to multi-party section 5 
agreements’ applicable to LLPs.56   
The Australian Decisions 
In Australia, the courts have taken the opposing view and have held that partnerships can be 
automatically dissolved by acceptance of repudiatory breach. Citing as his authority the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Hurst v Bryk (the correctness of which Lord Millett subsequently questioned on 
appeal), Coldrey J noted in Johnson v Snaddon that ‘[i]t cannot be doubted that, as with any contract, 
a partnership agreement may be breached, and such breach may involve repudiation’.57 However, in 
                                                            
51 [2003] All ER (D) 117 at [22]. 
52 [2012] EWHC 269 (QB). 
53 Ibid at [60]. 
54 Ibid at [139]. 
55 [2015] EWHC 2171 (Ch) at [242]. 
56 Ibid at [243]. 
57 [1999] VSC 243 at [100]. 
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the particular circumstances of that case, he then went on to find that there had not been a 
repudiation of the partnership agreement, so the matter clearly did not receive his full consideration.  
On both grounds, therefore, the decision cannot be regarded as strong authority for the proposition 
that partnerships can be automatically dissolved on acceptance of a repudiatory breach — especially 
as his decision preceded Lord Millett’s comments by some nine months. 
In 2004, the question came before the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Ryder v Frohlich58 in which 
it was alleged that, by leaving his firm to accept paid employment elsewhere, the appellant had 
committed a repudiatory breach of the partnership agreement, which had then been accepted by the 
respondent agreeing to the departure — thereby automatically terminating the partnership. After 
discussing both Hurst v Bryk and Mullins v Laughton (and in a decision with which the remainder of 
the court agreed), McColl JA took the view that, in the circumstances of that case, Ryder’s departure 
was a repudiation, Frohlich had accepted it and that that had been enough to terminate the 
partnership.59  
On the specific question of the correctness (or otherwise) of Lord Millett’s views, her Honour noted 
that neither party had drawn the court’s attention to Hurst v Bryk and that (emphasis added): 
As will be apparent, I have concluded that the primary judge’s decision can be sustained both on 
the basis that Mr Frohlich elected to accept Mr Ryder’s repudiatory conduct as well as on the basis 
that the partnership had been determined by abandonment, so it is not necessary to explore this 
fascinating point further. It might be noted, however, that a conclusion that ordinary principles of 
contract law applied to partnership, notwithstanding the provisions of the Partnership Act 1892 
(NSW), might be thought to be appropriate “in the light of the essential elements of the bargain, 
the modern money economy and the modern development of contract law”: Progressive Mailing 
House Pty Limited v Tabali Pty Limited, above, at 29 per Mason J (as he then was).60  
In his concurring judgment, Ipp JA was similarly equivocal, finding that: 
whatever technical labels one may choose — acceptance of repudiation, abandonment, agreement 
by conduct, unilateral act, or some other doctrine — common sense rebels against the notion that 
the appellants can now be permitted to assert that the partnership was not terminated.61 
As a result, this decision, like that in Johnson v Snaddon, cannot be regarded as strong authority for 
the proposition it advanced — a conclusion supported by White J’s subsequent decision in Walker v 
Melham.62  
In that case, one partner in a ski-lodge partnership told the other that he was no longer prepared to 
work in the business and, thereafter, he took no further part in it. Although that clearly constituted a 
repudiation of that partner’s obligations under the partnership agreement, White J expressly chose 
not to decide the question of dissolution on that basis, preferring instead to hold that Walker had 
abandoned the partnership and had, thereby, dissolved it. As His Honour said: 
The proper characterisation of these events is that Mr Walker abandoned the basis on which the 
parties had agreed that the partnership would be conducted, and thereby abandoned the 
partnership. … he did abandon the relations to which the parties had agreed …  
I do not decide this issue on the ground that Mr Walker repudiated the contract of partnership and 
that his repudiation was accepted. … I do not need to go into that question. Nor do I go into the 
debate as to whether acceptance of the repudiation of a partnership contract will itself dissolve 
                                                            
58 [2004] NSWCA 472. 
59 Ibid at [121] and [124]-[126]. 
60 Ibid at [133]. 
61 Ibid at [12]. 
62 [2007] NSWSC 264. 
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the partnership. That question was considered by McColl JA in Ryder v Frohlich. It is enough that 
the partnership was abandoned.63 
Subsequent decisions have been similarly equivocal, though all seem to have preferred McColl JA's 
general approach to that of Lord Millett.  
In Bonzalie v Cullu,64 for example, Robb J, after noting that ‘the parties appear to have approached the 
issue of termination as if it were brought about by repudiation and acceptance of repudiation, or by 
abandonment,’65 then went on to say: ‘If that were the correct approach, the applicable legal principles 
would be as set out in the judgment of McColl JA in [Ryder v Frohlich]’ (emphasis added).66 He did not, 
however pursue that line further, finding instead that, as a partnership at will, the partnership could 
be terminated by notice and that that had occurred, because ‘the conduct of the plaintiff … constituted 
the clearest notice that the plaintiff did not wish the partnership to continue — indeed he would not 
physically permit it to continue’.67  
 In Fazio v Fazio,68 although an allegation of termination by acceptance of repudiation was raised in 
the pleadings, the court found that it was not necessary to deal with it. Despite that, Murphy JA (with 
whom Pullin and Newnes JJA agreed) went on to say that Ryder v Frohlich had held that accepted 
repudiation could effect a dissolution (while also noting that '[t]here is dicta and authority to the 
contrary in England', citing Hurst v Bryk and Mullins v Laughton69) — but then indicated a clear 
preference for McColl JA’s view, saying:  
It seems to me with respect, that if, at law, the contract from which the relation ‘springs’ (see Booth 
v Booth) has been validly terminated at law (and assuming there is no equitable constraint on the 
innocent party exercising its legal right to terminate, eg, an equitable estoppel), it is difficult, at 
least prima facie to envisage that relationship subsisting’.70  
However, he also specifically said, 'the point … was not tested in the heat of debate at the hearing of 
this appeal, and it is not necessary to express a concluded view for the disposition of this case’.71 
In Letizia Building Co Pty Ltd v Redglow Asset Pty Ltd,72 while the court found that there had been a 
repudiation, it also found that there was a question about whether it had been accepted. Accordingly, 
especially as he had found in favour of the defendants on two other grounds, Beech J simply 
commented that, 'it is unnecessary to determine whether the agreement came to an end by 
acceptance on the part of the defendants of the plaintiff's repudiation'.73 
In Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd,74 a case involving a joint venture agreement rather than a 
partnership, Jackson J held that the breaches of an implied term that the parties would act in good 
faith towards each other in the performance of the contract and in the exercise of the powers 
thereunder  were ‘matters that destroy the mutual relationship of good faith that is the basis of a joint 
venture relationship that is either a partnership or as closely analogous to a partnership as in the 
                                                            
63 Ibid at [28]-[29]. 
64 [2013] NSWSC 1576. 
65 Ibid at [72].  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at [78]. That conduct included the plaintiff assaulting the defendant, preventing her entering the property 
to participate in the partnership’s business and culminated in a solicitor’s letter which purported to terminate 
the lease over the property (which was owned by the plaintiff) in which the business was carried on and 
threatened the defendant with a claim of trespass if she entered the property. 
68 [2012] WASCA 72. 
69 Ibid at [412]. 
70 Ibid. See also at [76]. 
71 Ibid. 
72 [2013] WASC 171. 
73 Ibid at [174]. 
74 [2019] 1 Qd R 107. 
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present case’.75 He therefore held that the contract had terminated as a result of acceptance of the 
defendant’s repudiation.76 In doing so, though, he again sidestepped the question of whether Lord 
Millett’s views or those of McColl JA should be preferred (although, while acknowledging the former, 
seeming to prefer the latter), saying: 
… in Hurst v Bryk Lord Millett queried whether a party to a partnership contract could terminate 
the contract for the other party’s breach. It is unnecessary for me to consider the point in detail. 
Where, as here, the contract is, in commercial substance, between only two parties, some of the 
potential problems do not arise. But, in any event it is enough for present purposes that the Court 
of Appeal on New South Wales considered that the ordinary contractual principles of termination 
can apply in Ryder v Frohlich.  
Therefore, even though none of the Australian courts needed to commit one way or another to 
whether partnerships could be brought to an end by accepted repudiation in order to reach their 
ultimate decisions, their clear consensus is that they can be. 
Common Features 
Although the courts in the United Kingdom and Australia have taken different views about the extent 
to which Lord Millett’s views should be accepted and applied, they share at least three common 
features. 
a. in every case in both jurisdictions the views expressed were made in the absence of any 
significant considered argument;  
b. in no case was determination of the question pivotal to the outcome of the case; and 
c. perhaps unsurprisingly given the first two common features, none engaged in any real critical 
analysis of Lord Millett’s views.    
In Hurst v Bryk itself, both the court at first instance and the Court of Appeal had accepted that the 
partnership there could be (and had been) brought to an end by Hurst accepting his partner’s 
repudiatory breach, that finding was not challenged on appeal and, as Lord Millett himself 
acknowledged, ‘In these circumstances I am content to proceed on the basis of the same assumption 
while reserving for future consideration the question whether it is correct’.77  
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, the only other of their Lordships to express a personal view, also noted a 
preference ‘to keep open for another occasion the question whether a partnership can be 
automatically dissolved by an innocent partner or partners treating the other partner’s or partners’ 
breach as repudiatory [because] [t]hat question does not call for decision in the present case’.78   
In Mullins v Laughton Neuberger J, after acknowledging that ‘the point is plainly difficult’ reached the 
conclusion that Lord Millett’s ‘provisional view’ should prevail simply ‘on the basis of the written 
material and brief oral argument’79 and then, in case he was wrong on the point, held that the 
defendants’ conduct had been repudiatory and that Mullins had accepted that repudiation. He then, 
however, side-stepped the real issue and, after finding that dissolution was justified under both ss 
35(d) and (f), ultimately decided not to wind the partnership up and made a Syers v Syers order 
instead.80  
                                                            
75 Ibid at [192]. 
76 Ibid at [198]-[200]. 
77 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 196. 
78 Ibid at 189. 
79 [2003] Ch 250 at [93]. 
80 Ibid at [103] and [107]. 
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On the particular facts of Khurll v Poulter, it was held that the contract had not been repudiated and, 
therefore, that ‘it is not necessary for me to decide this important question’.81  
In Barber v Rasco International Ltd,82 while Lord Millett’s views (as endorsed by Neuberger J) were 
clearly preferred, their adoption was expressly limited, in that case, to the three-partner partnership 
then before the court and, even then, with the further practical qualification that on the facts of the 
case:  
… there is no scope for the partnership to be dissolved by the acceptance by Mr Rassouli of the 
repudiatory conduct of Mr Barber and Mr Jangra even if such conduct had occurred83 (emphasis 
added)  
The judgment in Golstein v Bishop84 was similarly restricted in scope (if unequivocal in its support of 
Lord Millett’s general principle85 — despite the express acknowledgement in the court below that ‘It 
is true that Lord Millett did not hear argument, and did not express a final view’86). However, Briggs LJ 
specifically prefixing the relevant parts of his judgment with the words, 'this appeal is not about 
deciding … whether repudiation has any place in the context of dissolution of partnerships … [nor] … 
whether there is any exception to Lord Millett’s analysis, in the case of a two partner firm, where some 
but by no means all his objections to the recognition of dissolution by accepted repudiation fall 
away'.87  
That comment is probably unsurprising given that, as his Lordship acknowledged in the following 
paragraph, the trial judge had held ‘that there cannot be automatic dissolution of any partnership by 
accepted repudiation and Mr Golstein has not challenged [that] decision’ (emphasis added).88 His 
Lordship’s acceptance of Lord Millett’s views was also significantly qualified by his acknowledgement 
that his own view of the question ‘adds nothing of substance, since the point was not subjected to any 
adversarial argument in this court’.89  
The Australian decisions were similarly constrained.  
In Ryder v Frohlich, the case which laid down what came to be the accepted Australian position, McColl 
JA specifically noted that ‘[n]either of the parties drew the Court’s attention to Hurst v Bryk’90 before 
                                                            
81 [2003] All ER (D) 117 at [22]. 
82 [2012] EWHC 269 (QB). 
83 Ibid at [60]. 
84 [2014] Ch 455. 
85 Ibid at [10]. 
86 [2014] Ch 131 at [120] — though his Honour did then go on to note that ‘but this does not diminish the force 
of the points he made. I accept that there are points to be made on the other side: the point is plainly arguable 
and indeed difficult (as Neuberger J described it, at para 93). In particular I can see, as Lindley & Banks suggests, 
that Lord Millett’s view can leave the innocent partner in a position of some difficulty pending an application to 
the court for dissolution. The force of this however is somewhat diminished by the considerations that (i) as 
Neuberger J said, at para 92, even if the doctrine applies, the parties may be left in uncertainty until the court 
has ruled on whether the conduct was in fact repudiatory; and (ii) I suspect it will often be the case (as happened 
in both this case and Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 itself) that in practice the parties will agree that the partnership 
is undoubtedly over even though there is a dispute over the legal mechanism by which it came to an end. In any 
event this does not detract from the central points made by Lord Millett that the discretionary power in the 
court to dissolve sits uneasily with a right for the innocent party to bring about an automatic dissolution out of 
court; and that the relationship of partnership subsists not just between the repudiating and accepting partners 
but between all the partners, and a legal mechanism is needed to bring about a dissolution as between all 
partners. In the circumstances I conclude that I should follow Neuberger J unless his decision can be 
distinguished.’ 
87 [2014] Ch 455 at [9]. 
88 Ibid at [10]. 
89 Ibid. 
90 [2004] NSWCA 472 at [133] — a matter specifically referred to by His Honour in Golstein v Bishop at first 
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noting that she had concluded that the primary judge’s decision could be sustained both on the basis 
of acceptance of repudiation and abandonment ‘so it is not necessary to explore this fascinating point 
further’.91 Ipp JA was similarly equivocal, having decided that the partnership had in fact been 
terminated, and held that it was largely immaterial whether it was because of ‘acceptance of 
repudiation, abandonment, agreement by conduct, unilateral act, or some other doctrine’.92  
In Walker v Melham White J expressly chose not to decide the case on the Issue of accepted 
repudiation (despite there being a clear repudiation), finding instead that the partnership there, as 
with the partnership in Ryder v Frohlich, had been dissolved by abandonment.93  
The decision in Bonzalie v Cullu, while expressly preferring McColl’s view, also side-stepped the 
underlying issue finding that, although the parties had approached the issue on the basis that the 
termination had been brought about by accepted repudiation, found that, as the partnership was a 
partnership at will, it had, in fact, been terminated by notice.94 
Fazio v Fazio similarly refused to address the issue directly and, while expressing a preference for 
McColl JA’s views, the court did so with the qualification that ‘the point … was not tested in the heat 
of debate at the hearing of this appeal, and it is not necessary to express a concluded view for the 
disposition of this case.95 
The point was also not tested in Letizia Building Co Pty Ltd v Redglow Asset Pty Ltd,96 despite the court 
finding that there had been a repudiation. Instead it questioned whether it had been accepted and 
found for the defendants on two other grounds, commenting that as a result, 'it is unnecessary to 
determine whether the agreement came to an end by acceptance on the part of the defendants of 
the plaintiff's repudiation'.97 
Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd,98 also refused to engage in any discussion of the underlying 
question, and while preferring McColl’s view, the court held that as the contract there was a two-party 
contract, any of the potential problems that Lord Millett had identified simply did not arise.99 
The result is that while the Courts in England and Wales and the courts in Australia have both 
expressed a clear, if diametrically opposed, preference for whether Lord Millett’s views should be 
accepted, either generally or with identified qualifications, neither have actually, finally and 
unequivocally settled the question.  
If they are to do so a much more detailed analysis than has occurred to date is necessary and it will 
need to answer at least three specific questions: 
a. what exactly did Lord Millett mean when he said that partnerships could not be brought to an 
end by accepted repudiation; 
b. how valid were his reasons for adopting that view; and 
c. in the end result does it really matter? 
                                                            
instance (at [116]). He then also went on to say about McColl’s decision, ‘His (sic) decision is therefore neither 
reached after adversarial argument, nor regarded by him (sic) as a definitive view’, an interesting comment as 
he then also noted in relation to Lord Millett’s views (at [120]) that: ‘It is true that Lord Millett did not hear 
argument, and did not express a final view, but this does not diminish the force of the points he made’. 
91 Ibid. 
92 [2014] Ch 455 at [12]. 
93 [2007] NSWSC 264 at [28]-[29]. 
94 [2013] NSWSC 1576 at [78]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 [2013] WASC 171. 
97 Ibid at [174]. 
98 [2019] 1 Qd R 107. 
99 Ibid at [187]. 
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What Did Lord Millet Actually Mean? 
A significant problem with Lord Millett’s views is that they are capable of two possible interpretations. 
The first can be taken from the passage where he says: 
Repudiation as a ground of dissolution first saw the light of day in Hitchman v Crouch Butler Savage 
Associates (1982) 80 LS Gaz 550, where Harman J treated as axiomatic the proposition that the 
doctrine of repudiatory breach applies to partnership agreements as it applies to other contracts. 
The question, however, is not whether the doctrine applies to the contract of partnership, but 
whether it operates to bring about the automatic dissolution of the partnership relationship.100 
This would seem to indicate that Lord Millet had no fundamental problem with the proposition that 
the doctrine can apply to terminate the contract of partnership; his problem was whether it could also 
apply to dissolve the underlying partnership relationship (though his subsequent comment that ‘[t]he 
admission of a new ground of dissolution which is not mentioned in the Act and which would not have 
been recognised by the Court of Chancery is far from axiomatic’101 could call this interpretation into 
doubt). 
The Law Commission clearly took the view that that was Lord Millett’s intended meaning, saying in its 
2000 Consultation Paper: 
… in Hurst v Bryk in the House of Lords, Lord Millett has expressed the obiter view that an accepted 
repudiatory breach terminates the partnership contract, but that it does not bring about an 
automatic dissolution of the partnership.102  
However, if Lord Millett’s concern was not with whether the doctrine could apply to terminate the 
contract of partnership but only with whether it could dissolve the relationship, that, in itself, is 
problematic — and the necessarily underlying assumption, that there is a distinction between the 
contract under which the contract was formed (and, presumably, performed) and the partnership 
relationship that resulted from it, was expressly questioned in Fazio v Fazio where Murphy JA 
commented:  
It seems to me with respect, that, if, at law, the contract from which the contract ‘springs’ … has 
been validly terminated at law … it is difficult, at least prima facie, to envisage that relation 
subsisting.103 
It was also subject to comment by the Law Commission in its July 2000 Consultation Paper, albeit for 
slightly different reasons. The relevant passage reads:  
We respectfully question Lord Millett’s view. If it is correct, the termination of the contract will 
bring about a partnership at will which the accepting parties may then terminate immediately, 
rendering section 35(d) otiose. It seems strange that the accepting partners, having terminated the 
partnership agreement, should have to take any further step to terminate the partnership at will. 
In the circumstances of a repudiatory breach and an acceptance putting an end to the formal 
contract the conduct of the accepting partners is likely of itself to put an end to the partnership at 
will at the same time as it would commence under Lord Millett’s analysis.104 
Neuberger J dismissed those concerns in Mullins v Laughton saying: 
                                                            
100 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 195. 
101 Ibid. 
102 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 159, The Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 111 
Partnership Law A Joint Consultation Paper 31 July 2000, para 6.28. The same view seems to be taken in Lindley 
& Banks on Partnership (20th ed 2017) Thomson Reuters Sweet and Maxwell London, at 24.06. 
103 [2012] WASCA 72 at [412]. 
104 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 159, The Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 111 
Partnership Law A Joint Consultation Paper 31 July 2000, para 6.29. 
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It seems to have been assumed that [Lord Millett] held that the partnership contract could be 
terminated by accepted repudiation, so that the un-terminable partnership would merely be ‘a 
partnership at will which the accepting parties may then terminate immediately’. I am not at all 
convinced that that is the consequence of Lord Millett’s analysis. Indeed, on the basis that a 
partnership could not be dissolved by an accepted repudiation, I think that this analysis is wrong.105   
Instead, relying on an earlier passage in Lord Millett’s judgment (at 193 — see below), he said that 
‘This indicates to me that [Lord Millett] was suggesting that accepted repudiation could not determine 
the contract (or the partnership) while the partnership was in existence’106 — it could only do that in 
the period before the partnership actually commenced or in the period after it had come to an end 
but before it had been formally wound up. To that extent Neuberger J also seems to be accepting that 
the contract of partnership and the partnership relationship that results from it are two different 
things.  
Leaving aside the very obvious question about whether a single contract can be terminable by 
accepted repudiation at particular point in its life but not at others, his views (in the context of those 
of Lord Millett to which he referred) and the fact that they did not really resolve the question was 
referred to, without comment either way, in the Law Commission’s subsequent Report. It merely 
noted that: 
The decision of the House of Lords in Hurst v Bryk revealed a real uncertainty in the law as to 
whether the contractual rules on rescission by acceptance of a repudiatory breach of contract apply 
to dissolve a partnership. Lord Millett’s approach (that the contractual rules do not apply) has been 
followed by Neuberger J in Mullins v Laughton. (citations omitted)107 
That Report did, however then go on to note that its suggested reform of partnership law: 
… provides an opportunity to clarify the role of contractual doctrines in the dissolution of 
partnerships in order to remove the uncertainties which we have mentioned. We have concluded 
that the law can be simplified by defining in the draft Bill the grounds upon which a partnership 
may be brought to an end by the intervention of the court and by thus excluding the application of 
the doctrine of repudiatory breach in line with Lord Millett’s reasoning in Hurst v Bryk. We do this 
by providing in the draft Bill comprehensive lists of the events which break up a partnership and of 
the circumstances in which a person ceases to be a partner in a partnership.108 
                                                            
105 [2003] Ch 250 at [91].   
106 Ibid. His Honour cited as support for that view a passage in the 18th edition of Lindley & Banks on Partnership 
at para 24-06. In that para of the current edition Banks notes at n 34 that ‘Unknown to his Lordship, much of the 
reasoning set out in that paragraph of the Consultation Paper was derived from an earlier draft of this chapter, 
representing the current editor’s then preliminary view, whilst absorbing the full implications of Lord Millett’s 
speech. In the 20th edition (in the same footnote) Banks says: ‘Lord Millett should, however, not be taken to 
have suggested that a repudiation of the partnership contract whilst the partnership relationship exists would 
terminate the former and leave the latter in existence: were that to be the position, the partnership would, in 
any event, be transformed into a partnership at will and could be terminated at any time, without the need for 
any application under … s 35. … Needless to say, it would be a very exceptional case in which it could be argued 
that, notwithstanding a repudiatory breach, an express right to terminate the contract would have to be 
exercised’.   
107 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Partnership Law, Report on a Reference under s 
3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965. Cmnd 6015, 10 October 2003, at 8.83. 
108 Ibid at 8.84. Paragraph 137 of the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Draft Partnerships Bill that was 
included as Appendix A to that Report explained how the proposed cl 38, dealing with ‘Events which break up 
a partnership’, was intended to operate. Indicating the Law Commission’s continuing view that Lord Millett’s 
views had not then been accepted as decided legal principle, it read: ‘Under the existing law there has until 
recently been some doubt about the application of contractual doctrines such as repudiatory breach or 
frustration in such cases. The recent decision of the House of Lords in Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 has given 
guidance on this question. The approach of the draft Bill is consistent with the approach of Lord Millett in that 
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The Report’s proposed reforms, at least in relation to general partnerships were, however, rejected 
by the UK government in 2006.109 
The second possible interpretation of Lord Millett’s views can be taken from the passage in his 
judgment that was relied upon by Neuberger J where he said: 
The doctrine of accepted repudiation is of general application in the law of contract, and there is 
no reason why it should not apply to an agreement to enter into partnership or to the contractual 
obligations which the partners mutually undertake to observe after the partnership has come to 
an end. But I have considerable doubt that it can be employed to bring about the automatic 
dissolution of the partnership itself.110 
This could be taken to mean that while the doctrine of accepted repudiation could apply to partnership 
contracts it could not do so while the partnership was actually on foot, when it would be ‘within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery’,111 but only before it actually commenced operations or after it 
had terminated (but, presumably, before it was completely wound up).112  
That is the view that Neuberger J took in Mullins v Laughton and, by extrapolation, the view that both 
the primary judge and Briggs LJ, in the Court of Appeal, took in Golstein v Bishop — though, as already 
indicated, in neither case was that finding necessary for the decisions ultimately reached in those 
cases.  
There is, however, considerable merit in the Law Commission’s reservations about this possible 
interpretation. Dissolution of a partnership and termination of the partnership contract are not 
necessarily the same thing.  
Consequently, it may well be, as Lord Millett notes, that dissolution can only be effected in the manner 
set out in the Partnership Act, whether that be by court order under s 35, by the occurrence of one of 
the events provided for in ss 33 or 34, by expiration or notice under s 32, or otherwise by agreement 
between the partners.   
On the other hand, early termination of a contract normally depends solely on whether one party has 
elected to terminate for the other’s breach or repudiation. In the context of partnership contracts it 
is difficult to understand why an innocent partner should be deprived of his or her ‘normal’ contractual 
rights (unless they have been waived or varied under either the original partnership contract or some 
variation of it) to bring the contract to an end by acceptance of the other party’s breach or repudiation 
(at least in two-party partnerships). That would allow the innocent party to ensure that, for example, 
no further liabilities were incurred by the partnership (or, at least, to ensure that he or she was not 
liable for them by being immediately able to give third parties dealing with the firm notice of 
termination under ss 36 and/or 37 of the Partnership Act 1890 (UK)). In that way termination of the 
                                                            
case as adapted for a law of partnerships with separate legal personality. Under the draft Bill, acceptance of a 
repudiatory breach of contract will not cause a partnership to break up (see clause 38)’. 
109 Written Ministerial Statement, Ian McCartney, Hansard (HC), 20 July 2006, col 53WS. See also Ministry of 
Justice Report on the Implementation of Law Commission proposals, 22 January 2013 para 12. 
110 Ibid at 193. See also the discussion of this point by Neuberger J in Mullins v Laughton [2003[] Ch 250 at [91]. 
111 Ibid at 194. 
112 If this is what Lord Millett intended it would seem a little strange in that it is well-accepted that the partners’ 
fiduciary relationship (and therefore the jurisdiction of the courts of equity) extend to transactions both before 
the partnership formally commences (see, for example, United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 
157 CLR 1 at 12-13 per Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ, Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] 1 AC 161 at 227 and Conlon v 
Simms [2008] 3 All ER 802 at [127]-[128]) and after it has been dissolved, at least until such time as its affairs 
have been completely wound up (see, for example, Thompson's Trustee in Bankruptcy v Heaton [1974] 1 All ER 
1239 at 1249; [1974] 1 WLR 605 at 613 per Pennycuick V-C; Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 205 per Deane 
J and Metlej v Kavanagh [1981] 2 NSWLR 339).  
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partnership contract (like retirement, or even expulsion) could be a legitimate precursor to a formal 
winding up or a buy-out (on a ‘technical’ dissolution, such as occurs on retirement).113  
It is relevant to note that much the same concerns as were expressed by the Law Commission were 
also expressed by the editor of Lindley & Banks on Partnership 18th ed, 2002 at 24-09. In a passage 
cited by McColl JA in support of her view that accepted repudiation was a means by which partnerships 
could be brought to an end he said, ‘Lord Millett perhaps failed to take into account … the position in 
which the innocent partner is thereby placed’. He then went on, as Neuberger J subsequently put it in 
Mullins v Laughton:  
‘to explain that, if accepted repudiation could not dissolve the partnership, then an innocent party 
would be left in a state of uncertainty while he made an application to the court for dissolution 
pursuant to section 35 of the 1890 Act, during which period he would be left in an unfair state of 
uncertainty, and indeed would be unable to put an end to the partnership in the meantime.114 
While acknowledging that this was not a ‘negligible point’ Neuberger J rejected it on the grounds that 
‘it does not seem to me to be very forceful, and the present case provides a good example of why that 
is so’,115 saying: 
Even if the doctrine of accepted repudiation applies to a partnership, an innocent party who 
purports to accept a repudiatory breach would often not be certain as to whether or not the 
partnership had been brought to an end until the court decides on the issue of whether the breach 
was in fact repudiatory, and, indeed, on any other issue such as waiver, which might prevent the 
innocent partner relying on the dissolution’.116  
In the 20th edition of Lindley & Banks on Partnership that passage was referred to with the comment: 
The current editor remains unconvinced. If one takes the classic scenario exemplified in Mullins v 
Laughton itself, ie where a partner’s continuing membership of the firm is denied by the other 
partners and he is, as a result, excluded from further participation therein, on Lord Millett’s and 
Neuberger J’s approach, the partnership and the excluded partner’s liability as a member thereof 
will necessarily continue until such time as an order has been made under s 35 of the 1890 Act. The 
court has no power to backdate the dissolution and the excluded partner will, if held liable to a 
third party, have to seek an indemnity from his co-partners, either on the basis of their 
unauthorised conduct or by way of damages. The efficacy of such a right of indemnity will 
necessarily be dependent on the financial status of the other partners (citations omitted).117 
As is shown below, this difference between the two possible interpretations of Lord Millett’s meaning 
has potentially significant ramifications for the extent to which the reasons he gave for reaching his 
ultimate conclusions can be supported. 
 
How Valid are Lord Millett’s Reasons? 
In addition to the problem of determining what exactly Lord Millett intended there are also questions 
about the extent to which the reasons he gave for reaching his conclusion are likely to be upheld if 
they are subjected to a more rigorous analysis than that to which they have been exposed to date. 
Possible issues with each of those reasons are outlined below.   
                                                            
113 See, for example JW Carter et al, Contract Law in Australia (5th ed) LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney 2007 at 
[30-36]. 
114 Mullins v Laughton [2003] Ch 250 at [92]. 
115 Ibid 
116 Ibid. 
117 RI Banks, Lindley & Banks on Partnership (20th ed 2017) Thomson Reuters Sweet and Maxwell London, 24-09. 
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a. Accepted repudiation is not expressly included in the Act as a ground on which partnerships 
can be dissolved. 
Rejecting accepted repudiation as a means of terminating partnerships because it is not expressly 
referred to in the Act seems to be based on the proposition that termination of the partnership 
contract and dissolution of the partnership are one and the same thing, either generally or at least 
while the partnership is actually on foot (assuming that Neuberger J’s interpretation of that aspect of 
Lord Millett’s judgment is accepted). However, before that proposition is accepted there are a number 
of issues of principle that should be considered. 
The relationship between partners is affected by three factors: the terms of their partnership contract 
(both express and implied), the express provisions of the Partnership Act (which, in many cases, can 
be varied by the partners by including express terms to that effect in their contract) and the fiduciary 
relationship which exists between them (which can also be varied by the terms of their contract118). 
Each of those sets of rights arise (and exist) separately but the necessary conclusion is that, unless 
validly excluded, they will all co-exist. Further, the termination of one set of rights (and obligations) 
need not necessarily terminate the other rights (and obligations) at the same time — a proposition 
amply demonstrated by the fact that even after dissolution, the provisions of the Partnership Act 
continue to apply until winding-up is complete,119 as do the fiduciary duties that the now former 
partners’ owe one another.120  
Consequently, the mere termination of a partnership contract will not necessarily terminate the 
partnership relationship — it will continue until winding up is complete. 
That being the case there is considerable merit in the first of the two possible interpretations of Lord 
Millett’s views — that while an accepted repudiation might bring about a termination of the 
partnership contract it is ‘much more doubtful’ that it also ‘operates to bring about the automatic 
dissolution of the partnership relationship’.121 
Peden and Carter approached the question with one simple thesis: ‘The partnership legislation’s 
concept of dissolution of a partnership is not the same as the contractual concept of discharge’.122 This 
they said implied two things: first, that ‘general principles of contract law may be used to determine 
whether a partner is entitled to terminate a partnership contract [and] second, discharge of a 
partnership contract for breach or repudiation may occur before its dissolution’.123   
It is not certain that their second point is necessarily valid, because they used the term ‘dissolution’ 
both there and elsewhere in the paper to refer to the entire ‘dissolution’ process, up to and including 
finalisation of winding up. The wording of the Act, especially in ss 38 and 44, makes it clear that 
dissolution and winding up are not co-extensive; dissolution terminates the partnership relationship, 
winding-up, if it occurs, brings the firm’s business to an end.124  
                                                            
118 See, for example, Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 97 per Mason J. 
119 See, for example, the opening words of s 38: ‘After the dissolution of a partnership the authority of each 
partner to bind the firm and the other rights and obligations of the partners continue notwithstanding the 
dissolution so far as may be necessary to wind up the affairs of the partnership’ (emphasis added). See also ss 
39 (rights as to the application of partnership property) and 44 (rules for distribution of assets on final settlement 
of accounts). 
120 Thompson's Trustee in Bankruptcy v Heaton [1974] 1 All ER 1239 at 1249; [1974] 1 WLR 605 at 613 per 
Pennycuick V-C; Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 205 per Deane J; Metlej v Kavanagh [1981] 2 NSWLR 
339. 
121 Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 at 195. 
122 Elisabeth Peden and John Carter, The Bonds of Partnership (2000) 16 Journal of Contract Law 275 at 277. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See, for example, Commissioner of State Taxation (SA) v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 508 at [12] 
where the distinction between ‘general’ dissolutions and ‘technical or notional’ dissolutions is discussed. 
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Their first point is however conceptually valid, albeit that it clashes with the second possible 
interpretation of Lord Millett’s views (that apparently adopted by Neuberger J in Mullins v Laughton). 
In particular, they take issue with Lord Millett’s statement that ‘the admission of a new ground of 
dissolution which [is not mentioned in the Act] and which would not have been recognised by the 
Court of Chancery is far from axiomatic’125 — and they do so for two reasons. 
First, they say that:  
in principle, it is difficult to see why a partnership contract is not subject to the general principles 
which regulate the discharge of contracts. The general law of contract exists for the benefit of all 
contracting parties, and the presumption is that unless they have agreed to the contrary, principles 
regulating discharge apply.126 
Secondly, in relation to Lord Millett’s specific concern, they note that:  
Given that the modern law of discharge did not develop until the second half of the twentieth 
century, it is hardly surprising that the Act does not speak in terms of discharge for repudiation.127  
They also note that if Lord Millett’s view is correct there are a number of other circumstances which, 
under the general law, would lead to a contract being discharged, but, under his approach, would not 
apply to partnership contracts. They cite, as one instance, situations where the partnership agreement 
‘states that a particular obligation is an essential term of the contract’ and note that ‘Under Lord 
Millett’s approach, breach of that term does not entitle a partner to terminate the contract’.128  
The same might be said if a condition subsequent provided for in the contract occurred. Under the 
general law the innocent party would then be immediately entitled to terminate the contract and 
resume the status quo ante.129 If Lord Millett’s approach is correct, partners could be denied that right 
because the occurrence of a condition subsequent is not expressly referred to as a ground for 
dissolution in the Act.130 (It could, of course, be argued that, as an ‘agreement’, it might allow the 
partnership to be dissolved under s 32131 — but that, in itself, could create issues with disposition of 
any third party contracts the firm entered into before the occurrence, and even with how the 
partnership property should be dealt with on dissolution). 
A similar problem arises with whether the doctrine of frustration could apply to partnership contracts. 
Frustration is not expressly included in the Act as a ground on which partnerships might be dissolved 
and, if Lord Millett’s approach was applied consistently, then, as the Law Commission put it in its 2003 
Report, it would be ‘uncertain whether the contractual doctrine of frustration applies so as to bring 
                                                            
125 Peden and Carter (n 122) at 279. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. They also note that Lord Millett himself acknowledged that much of the modern law of discharge for 
breach or repudiation emerged after the enactment of the partnership legislation: see Hurst v Bryk at 193. 
128 Ibid at 281 
129 See, for example, Head v Tattersall (1871) LR 7 Exch 7 and Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418. The 
same issue would not arise on the failure of a condition precedent because, then, either the partnership itself 
or the obligation to perform would never have come into effect: McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd [1957] 59 
SR (NSW) 122 and Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537 at 543 per Gibbs CJ.   
130 It is unlikely that s 46 of the Partnership Act 1890 (UK) (Saving for rules of equity and common law) would 
alter this position because its operation has been restrictively interpreted to mean that ‘the rules of equity and 
common law so preserved are the rules of equity and common law relating to partnership, and to partnership 
only:’ Cameron v Murdoch (1986) 63 ALR 575 at 586 (PC) per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. Rules of general 
application seem to fall outside the section’s ambit. It might however be argued that the partnership in such 
cases had terminated by agreement. 
131 Either by a combination of ss 19 and 32 (as suggested by Lord Millett – though not in the context of conditions 
subsequent) or, as Neuberger J suggested in Chahal v Mahal [2005] 2 BCLC 655 at [21], by simply applying the 
opening words of s 32. 
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about the dissolution of a partnership’.132 Peden and Carter made the same point, although somewhat 
more forcefully, noting that ‘the doctrine of frustration cannot be applied because, again, discharge 
occurs under the general law’.133 
However, they then went on to suggest that the failure to include any express reference to potential 
occurrences, such as acceptance of repudiation and frustration, under which contracts could either 
be terminated at common law or terminate automatically, could be explained by the Act’s historical 
context and the state of the law in 1890. They said: 
One explanation for the absence of any reference to repudiation and frustration is, as we have 
indicated, the fact that these ideas only emerged a short time before the Act was drafted. Thus, 
repudiation was established as a distinct basis for discharge in 1872 [citing Frost v Knight (1872) LR 
7 Exch 111] and it was in 1874 that commercial frustration first came to light [citing Jackson v Union 
Marine Insurance Co Ltd (1874) LR 10 CP 125]. Moreover, the rationale for both repudiation and 
frustration was, in 1890, an implied term of the contract [citing Hockster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E&B 
678 at 689; 118 ER 922 at 926 per Lord Campbell and Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B&S 826 at 833-
34; 122 ER 309 at 312 respectively].  Pollock may well have taken the view that there was no need 
to state expressly what was implied in law.134   
This ‘implied term’ explanation for the omission of any express provision for dissolution on such 
occurrences would, in the context of the state of the law at the time the Act was passed, seem entirely 
feasible. It would also allow the other possible options for terminating a partnership that Ipp JA 
identified in Ryder v Frohlich, ‘abandonment,135 agreement by conduct, unilateral act, or some other 
doctrine’136 to be applied as means whereby partnerships could be dissolved — despite the absence 
of any express mention of them in the Act. 
There is therefore much to be said for the view that Peden and Carter took, that, contrary to Lord 
Millett’s views: ‘The question … is not whether the Act includes these principles but, instead, whether 
they are displaced by the Act’.137 They concluded that they were not. 
 
                                                            
132 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Partnership Law, Report on a Reference under s 
3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965. Cmnd 6015, 10 October 2003) at 8.83. In the same Report the Law 
Commission recommended the exclusion of ‘contractual doctrines such as acceptance of repudiatory breach of 
contract, frustration and rescission for fraud or misrepresentation’ as grounds on which a partnership could 
‘break up’. See cl 38 of the Draft Bill and para 115 of the Explanatory notes, both in Appendix A to the Report. 
See also para 137 of those Explanatory notes  
133 Peden and Carter (n 122) at 281. 
134 Ibid. 
135 There is a clear relationship between repudiation and abandonment which Lord Wilberforce referred to in 
Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571 at 574 saying: ‘in 
considering whether there has been a repudiation by one party, it is necessary to look at his conduct as a whole. 
Does this indicate an intention to abandon and to refuse performance of the contract?’ It follows that, in the 
normal course of events, abandonment of one’s obligations under a contract can constitute repudiation which 
entitles the other party to bring the contract to an end. However, abandonment (or discharge by consent 
inferred from inactivity) is also a quite separate basis on which a contract can be terminated if the parties’ 
conduct is such that neither can be taken to have intended that the contract would be further performed. 
Termination as a result of abrogation or abandonment, and termination as a result of acceptance of repudiatory 
breach, while related, are also not the same thing. As Murphy JA put it in Fazio v Fazio [2012] WASCA 72 at [412]: 
… both involve the discharge of further performance of the contract, but in the latter case, the innocent party 
maintains the right to sue for (common law) damages for the breach. See also Paal Wilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei 
Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854 at 914, 916-17, 920, 923 and 924-25. 
136 [2004] NSWCA 472 at [12]. 
137 Peden and Carter (n 122) at 279. 
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b. If accepted repudiation was accepted as an additional ground for automatic dissolution it 
would be difficult to see how it might apply in practice where there were more than two 
partners and one of them refused to accept the repudiatory breach — or if there are 
numerous partners who fall into two camps (so that an application to the court for dissolution 
would still be necessary either to terminate the partnership at all or to terminate the 
partnership as between parties in the same camps); 
Lord Millett himself accepted that, ‘the contractual doctrine applies to multilateral as well as two party 
contracts’ though he then went on to qualify that statement by saying:  
… but it merely affects the mutual discharge of reciprocal obligations. It necessarily operates 
bilaterally as between each party in breach, and each party accepting the breach as repudiatory by 
discharging them from their reciprocal obligations. It is difficult to see how it can operate to 
discharge the parties in the same camp, whether guilty or innocent, from the obligations they owe 
each other. This can only be achieved by agreement.138 
However, is that really a problem? Parties can purport to terminate any contract by accepting the 
other party’s repudiation — through if the other party then disputes the validity of the termination 
either may to apply to the court for a declaration either that it was valid or that it was not (Neuberger 
J’s point in Mullins v Laughton).  
If it was valid, the inescapable result is that the contract came to an end at the point at which the 
repudiation was accepted and, as Dixon J said in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (in the passage 
expressly referred to by Lord Millett), the effect is that the parties’ mutual obligations terminated at 
that point. In the case of partnerships that means that the partnership is dissolved and the winding-
up process can then commence.  
If it was invalid, then the contract will not have terminated and the partnership will not have been 
dissolved. Therefore, if the parties do wish to bring it to an end they would have to do so using one of 
the dissolution provisions in the Act.  
However, that would not impose an undue burden. The court can use the same proceedings in which 
the validity of the accepted repudiation was challenged to dissolve the partnership anyway. That could 
be on any of the grounds specified in s 35, including s 35(d)’s wilful and persistent breach ground 
(which would almost certainly apply if the breach was repudiatory though not validly ‘accepted’) or, if 
the conduct was not repudiatory, under s 35(c) if it was sufficiently ‘calculated to prejudicially affect 
the carrying on of the business’, or under s 35(f) if it was otherwise ‘just and equitable that the 
partnership be dissolved’.139  
If the partnership is one at will, which could therefore be terminated by notice, even that step would 
not be necessary. However, if notice was given and its validity was disputed, the court before which 
the matter was tried could still order dissolution and could even backdate it to the first point of notice. 
That could be the time of the purported acceptance of the repudiatory breach, which would normally 
be effective as notice that the innocent partner (or partners) no longer wanted to remain in 
partnership with the partner (or partners) in default.140 Alternatively, it could be to the 
commencement of the action, because service of pleadings in which the existence of a partnership is 
denied is effective notice of an intention to dissolve and the partnership can then be dissolved from 
the date the proceedings were issued.141  
                                                            
138 [2002] 1 AC 185 at 195. 
139 This was in fact the specific outcome in Brew v Rozano Holdings Ltd 2006 BCCA 346. 
140 Notice need not be in any particular form though it should be clear and unambiguous: Syers v Syers (1876) 1 
App Cas 174 at 183 per Lord Cairns. 
141 Kirby v Carr (1838) 3 Y & C Ex 184; Unsworth v Jordan [1896] WN (Pt 2) 5; Yard v Yardoo Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 
35 at [104]; Reynolds v Medway [2013] NSWSC 206 at [40]. 
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There is in fact much to be said for the Law Commission’s view that, subject to certain qualifications,142 
the effect of an accepted repudiation would be to bring the contract of partnership to an end, with 
the result that: 
The termination of the contract will bring about a partnership at will which the accepting parties 
may then terminate immediately, rendering section 35(d) otiose. 143  
As the Consultation Paper then went on: 
It seems strange that the accepting partners, having terminated the partnership agreement, should 
have to take any further step to terminate the partnership at will. In the circumstances of a 
repudiatory breach and an acceptance putting an end to the formal contract the conduct of the 
accepting partners is likely of itself to put an end to the partnership at will at the same time as it 
would commence under Lord Millett’s analysis. 
If that analysis is correct that ‘further step’ would not be required – whether the partnership was 
originally a partnership at will or a fixed term partnership which was terminated and converted to a 
partnership at will by the innocent partner’s acceptance of the defaulting partner’s repudiatory 
breach. In either case all that would be required to terminate the partnership and, therefore, to 
initiate the winding up process, would be ‘notice’ under s 32(c), which, as already noted, could be 
found in the act of accepting the repudiatory conduct. 
Neuberger J rejected the Law Commission’s analysis ‘on the basis that a partnership could not be 
dissolved by an accepted repudiation’. With respect, that seems to put the cart before the horse. Lord 
Millett argued that accepted repudiation could not be a means of terminating a partnership because 
that would create undue post-termination problems. The Law Commission’s Consultation paper 
argues that Lord Millett’s conclusion was wrong because there is an alternative analysis. To reject that 
alternative analysis because it is inconsistent with or does not produce the desired conclusion involves 
what appears to be severely flawed logic. 
The Law Commission’s analysis of this aspect of Lord Millett’s objection is particularly apposite in cases 
involving two-party partnerships where, as Briggs LJ noted in Golstein v Bishop,144 ‘some but by no 
means all [of Lord Millett’s] objections to the recognition of dissolution by accepted repudiation fall 
away’.145 
However, it is also equally arguable in multi-partner partnerships. Lord Millett postulates that an 
application to the court under s 35(d) would be needed:  
where there are more than two partners and there is at least one partner who is innocent of any 
wrongdoing and who does not accept the repudiation. It would also arguably be needed even in a 
case like the present where there are numerous partners who fall into only two camps, those who 
are alleged to have committed a repudiatory breach and those who claim to have accepted it.146  
However, he then goes on to acknowledge that:  
the contractual doctrine applies to multiparty as well as two party contracts, but … it necessarily 
operates bilaterally as between each party in breach and each party accepting the breach [and] it 
is difficult to see how this can operate to discharge the parties in the same camp.147 
                                                            
142 As the Consultation Paper noted at 6.28, ‘clauses like arbitration clauses may survive’. 
143 Ibid. 
144 [2014] Ch 455. 
145 See also Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd [2019] 1 Qd R 107 where it was held that, as the contract there 
was a two-party contract, the potential problems that Lord Millett had identified simply did not arise. 
146 [2002] 1 AC 195. 
147 Ibid. 
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With respect, this misstates what would be the legal effect if even one partner accepted a repudiatory 
breach by another. If, as Lord Millett suggests, that action would discharge those parties from their 
reciprocal obligations (as it should), it has another effect which is not present in multilateral contracts 
generally (where, as Lord Millett also suggests, the contract between the other parties could remain 
on foot unless there was an agreement to the contrary148).   This is because, as his Lordship also noted 
earlier in his judgment ‘while partnership is a consensual arrangement based on agreement, it is more 
than a simple contract … it is a continuing personal as well as commercial relationship’.149  
Because of this unique aspect of partnerships it has always been recognised that any change in the 
composition of a partnership automatically dissolves that partnership in its entirety.150 The remaining 
partners may agree to continue with the firm’s business without the outgoing partner (after having 
reached agreement to buy out his or her interest so a formal winding up is not necessary) but, if they 
do, they do so as members of a new and separately constituted partnership.151 
Therefore, if, as Lord Millett suggests, the acceptance by even one partner of a repudiatory breach by 
any other partner ‘would discharge those parties from their reciprocal obligations’ it would not only 
terminate the contract (and dissolve the partnership) between them, it would, because of the 
resulting change, also dissolve the partnership as a whole. It would then be up to the (now) former 
partners, collectively, to decide whether they wished to continue the business with a new partnership 
— whether it consisted of the partners in the old firm less the partner guilty of repudiatory breach, 
less the partner who brought the old firm to an end by accepting that repudiatory breach or in some 
other combination.  
Disputes as to individual entitlements could, of course, be dealt with in the winding-up process, 
whether formal or through a buy-out, and it could even be governed under one of the Law 
Commission’s Consultation Papers ‘qualifications’, with any provisions included in the original 
partnership agreement for how a buy-out on dissolution should be conducted surviving the 
dissolution.152 Alternatively, as in Sobell v Boston [1975] 2 All ER 282, the question might be settled 
pursuant to some quite separate agreement reached after dissolution became a real possibility. If the 
parties could not reach agreement they would also still have recourse to the courts, either for 
appointment of a receiver, or receiver and manager or, in appropriate cases, to apply for a Syer v Syers 
order after dissolution (as was the outcome in Mullins v Laughton).     
Therefore, as Peden and Carter suggest, it is possible that ‘the proper perspective on discharge is that 
it is analogous to retirement’.153 That is, it ends the contract, it ends the partnership between the 
repudiating and the accepting parties and, because of the ‘special’ nature of partnerships, it also ends 
the partnership as a whole.     
                                                            
148 Ibid at 195-96. See also Petrocapital Resources plc v Morrison & Foerster (UK) LLP [2013] EWHC 2682 (Ch) at 
[166]. 
149 Ibid at 194. 
150 Rushton (Qld) Pty Ltd v Rushton (NSW) Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 320 at 323 per McPherson JA. 
151 Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1989] NZLR 447 at 455; Commissioner of State Taxation (SA) v Cyril 
Henschke Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 508 at [11]; Income Tax Commissioners (City of London) v Gibbs [1942] AC 402, 
particularly at 414 per Viscount Simon LC; at 429, 430 per Lord Wright; at 432 per Lord Porter; Brace v Calder 
[1895] 2 QB 253 at 258 per Lord Esher MR; at 261 per Lopes LJ; at 263 per Rigby LJ. 
152 See, for example, Biliora Pty Ltd v Leisure Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 11 NTLR 148. 
153 Ibid at 281. There are two obvious problems with this argument. First, s 26 only provides for retirement from 
partnerships at will, which can be brought to an end by notice anyway — so an application under s 35 is not 
necessary). Secondly, an outgoing partner’s liability to third parties differs depending on whether he or she has 
‘retired’ or the partnership has been otherwise dissolved. If the latter he or she remains liable until the third 
party has either actual notice or, in the case of those who had not dealt with the firm before dissolution, until 
the dissolution has been advertised under s 36(2). With retirement the retiring partner is simply not liable for 
partnership debts contracted after retirement, at least as regards those who did not know that he or she had 
been a partner: see s 36(3).  
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Lord Millett’s comment to the effect that acceptance of repudiatory breach as an additional ground 
for automatic dissolution where there were more than two partners ‘would lead to a very odd 
distinction between those (few) cases where dissolution was automatic and those cases where it was 
not’154 is not a real issue. As a result, his concerns about the possible effect of accepted repudiation 
on the residual relationships within the original firm are effectively baseless. 
c. It would circumvent the discretionary power of the court to order dissolution under the wilful 
or persistent breach provision in s 35(d). 
Lord Millett suggested that this was the ‘strongest argument against admitting repudiatory breach as 
a further ground for the automatic dissolution of a partnership’.155  
In contrast, Peden and Carter argue that nothing in s 35:  
‘exclude[s] the right of a partner to elect to terminate the contract which underlies the partnership 
for the other partners’ repudiation. It would indeed be quite shocking  for a partner to be bound 
by his or her fiduciary obligations to persons in whom he or she had ceased to have trust and 
confidence … with no more than a right to contribution from them of their share of any loss which 
the partnership suffers in the meantime’.156 
Their contrary view is that ‘the proper perspective on discharge is that it is analogous to retirement’157 
— it ends the contract and, at least as regards the partner who exercises the right (by accepting the 
other’s repudiation), it ends the partnership. It does not however end the underlying relationship 
which will continue until the firm is wound up (or that partner’s interest is bought out).  
It also does not automatically terminate that partner’s liability to third parties with whom the firm has 
dealt. That will only occur when they have been notified of the change under ss 36 and 37. If necessary, 
and to put the matter beyond doubt, that partner could also apply for a formal order for dissolution 
under s 35 — thereby addressing Neuberger’s concerns that: 
Even if the doctrine of accepted repudiation applies to a partnership, an innocent partner, who 
purports to accept a repudiatory breach, would often not be certain as to whether or not the 
partnership has been brought to an end, until the court decides on the issue of whether the breach 
was in fact repudiatory, and, indeed, on any other issue, such as waiver, which might prevent the 
innocent partner relying on dissolution.158 
As Peden and Carter then went on to say: 
There is in this respect nothing unique about partnerships. Termination of any contract merely has 
the effect of discharging the parties from their respective performance obligations. Further 
consequences, such as recovery of restitution, or a contractual debt or damages, necessarily 
depend on court order giving effect to rights which existed at the time of termination.159 
                                                            
154 Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 at 196. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Peden and Carter (n 122) at 280-81 
157 Ibid at 281. See also Lawrence Jacobson Separate ways (2011) 155 SJ (39) pp 14—15. The issue with 
Jacobsen’s view, that the innocent party’s acceptance of a repudiation could take effect as a notice determining 
the partnership under ss 26 and 32(c), is that the notice provision there only applies to partnerships at will. 
Therefore, the suggestion in para 6.29 of the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper that the outcome of Lord 
Millett’s view of accepted repudiation would be that ‘the termination of the contract will bring about a 
partnership at will’ would mean that that step would be needed even if it and the notice were then regarded as 
contemporaneous events.   
158 [2003] Ch 250 at [92]. 
159 Peden and Carter (n 122) at 282-83. 
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There is also the practical consideration that, even if the court does have a discretion not to order 
dissolution under s 35, that discretion has historically been used sparingly.160 Even where it has been 
used it has mainly been to refuse dissolution when the application was because of allegations that a 
partner was of permanently unsound mind or permanently incapable of performing his or her part of 
the partnership contract, or because the business could only be carried on at a loss.161  
In each of those cases the discretion is justified (and has been used) because the insanity or the 
incapacity might not be ‘permanent’,162 or might not be such as to render the affected partner 
completely incapable of performing his or her part of the partnership contract,163 or because the 
inability to generate profit might only be the result of something of an extraordinary or temporary 
nature.164 
Where dissolution is sought for behaviour that would constitute repudiation at common law it will 
generally be sought, as Lord Millett indicated, under s 35(d), for wilful or persistent breach (though, if 
there was any doubt about whether the conduct was sufficiently wilful or persistent to justify an order 
under s 35(d), it could also be sought under s 35(c) for prejudicial conduct, or under s 35(f) because it 
is just and equitable to order dissolution165).  
It is less likely that the discretion to refuse dissolution would be exercised in such cases because it will 
also almost invariably have resulted in it no longer being ‘reasonably practicable for the other partner 
or partners to carry on the business in partnership with [the offending partner]’.166 Even in Mullins v 
Laughton, where Neuberger J specifically referred to the discretion, he did not exercise it. Instead, he 
determined that the partnership should be dissolved, either because of the accepted repudiation or 
under each of ss 35(d) and 35(f), but then, having determined that it would not ‘be right to wind up 
the partnership,’ he elected to make a Syers v Syers order instead, requiring the defendants to buy the 
claimant out.167 
Consequently, the  importance of the discretion, at least in respect of ss 35(c), (d) and (f), seems to be 
to allow the court to bring the partnership to an end in some other way — not to refuse to dissolve it 
at all. Where the discretion does have a place is, as Neuberger J said, ‘if another course would achieve 
a more just result’.168 That might occur where, as the latest edition of Lindley & Banks on Partnership 
puts it, ‘there is some other remedy open to the partner(s) seeking a dissolution’.169 Those remedies 
might include expulsion of the partner in default if the agreement contains an appropriate power to 
expel, or retirement of the partner(s) seeking dissolution if that is an option that they could elect 
without suffering adverse financial consequences (which could occur if their entitlements on winding-
up exceeded their entitlements on retirement).170 
                                                            
160 Mainly in instances where, although dissolution could be ordered, ‘another course would achieve a more just 
result’: Mullins v Laughton [2003] Ch 250 at [108] per Neuberger J. 
161 Partnership Act 1890 (UK) ss 35(a), (b) and (f) respectively. 
162 See, for example, Whitwell v Arthur (1865) 35 Beav 140; 5 ER 848. 
163 Sadler v Lee (1843) 6 Beav 324; 49 ER 850. 
164 Handyside v Campbell (1901) 17 TLR 623. 
165 Peden and Carter (n 122) at 280. 
166 See, for example Brew v Rozano Holdings Ltd [2009 BCCA 346 at [27]. 
167 Thereby confirming the fact of dissolution because Syers v Syers orders can only be made after dissolution, 
as an alternative to a formal winding-up. 
168 [2003] Ch 250 at [108]. 
169 Banks (n 117) at 24-71. 
170 In Rutt v Head (1996) 20 ACSR 160 Santow J refused to dissolve a two-man partnership because the 
partnership deed contained a withdrawal option. The partner seeking the dissolution had contrived the 
breakdown and his lack of clean hands and the lack of a complete deadlock between the partners militated 
against a formal winding up. 
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Lord Millett’s objection on this third ground is, therefore, also not as damning as it might appear at 
first glance. 
Does it Matter? 
The short answer to the question, ‘Does it matter?’ is, ‘Yes it does’. The partnership relationship is 
fiduciary in nature and also involves unlimited liability for the debts and other obligations of the 
partnership,171 a statutory agency under which each partner is generally bound by the acts of his or 
her co-partners,172 and a range of other ancillary statutory provisions that impose some form of 
obligation or potential liability. They include provision for matters such as liability for acts done or 
instruments executed on behalf of the firm,173 responsibility for admissions or representations made 
by a partner,174 and deemed receipt of notice.175  
Except In partnerships at will where termination can be effected quickly and easily by simple notice, 
requiring partners who are clearly disinclined to remain in partnership with those who, by their 
actions, have indicated a clear unwillingness, inability or outright refusal to continue in the partnership 
or, at least, to do so while abiding by the terms of the partnership agreement, unless and until they 
can obtain a court order for dissolution, seems almost unconscionable. It exposes them to 
unnecessary risks of ongoing contractual, tortious and other liability, it prevents them from taking 
steps to reduce that liability by using the Act’s (post-dissolution) notification provisions176 and it 
imposes both unnecessary delay and potentially significant cost to bring about an end to a partnership 
which, in reality has already ceased to function in any realistic sense. It could even be seen to 
undermine the fundamental concepts that underlie the fiduciary nature of partnership relationships.  
In that context it is salutary to recall the words of Bacon VC in Helmore v Smith:  
Their mutual confidence is the life-blood of the concern. It is because they trust one another that 
they are partners in the first instance; it is because they continue to trust one another that the 
business goes on.177  
If that mutual trust no longer exists and there are grounds, such as an acceptance of repudiatory 
breach, on which the general law would allow the underlying contract to terminate, it is difficult to 
see why the law should impose further impediments to immediate dissolution.178 
That concern is also reflected in the statement in Lindley & Banks on Partnership179 that: 
… on Lord Millett’s and Neuberger J’s approach, the partnership and the excluded partner’s 
liability as a member thereof will necessarily continue until such time as an order has been made 
under s 35 of the 1890 Act … and the excluded partner will, if held liable to a third party, have to 
seek an indemnity from his co-partners … [t]he efficacy of [which] will necessarily be dependent 
on the financial status of the other partners (citations omitted).180 
Referring to Neuberger’s comment to the effect that there would be a period of uncertainty as to the 
effectiveness of the repudiation and acceptance until a court has ruled on the matter, Lindley & Banks 
                                                            
171 Partnership Act 1890 (UK) ss 9-13. 
172 Ibid s 5. 
173 Ibid s 6 
174 Ibid s 15. 
175 Ibid s 16. 
176 In particular under ss 36 and 37. 
177 (1886) 35 Ch D 436 at 444. 
178 This argument underpinned the decision in Lien v Clontarf Residential Pty Ltd [2019] 1 Qd R 107 that a joint 
venture relationship which was described as ‘closely analogous to a partnership’ had terminated by acceptance 
of the defendant’s repudiatory conduct. See, in particular at [192] and [198]-[200] per Jackson J. 
179 Banks (n 117) at 24-09. The same reservation was expressed in the 18th edition and, although Neuberger J 
rejected it in Mullins v Laughton (at [92]), McColl JA subsequently cited it with apparent approval in Ryder v 
Frohlich (at [130]). 
180 Banks (n 117) at 24-09. 
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goes on to note: 
Yet surely, uncertainty with a probable absence of continuing liability is preferable to uncertainty 
with a guarantee of continuing liability.181  
In reality Neuberger J’s concern can be readily catered for by existing general law provisions which 
allow terminations to be challenged and, if shown to be unwarranted, to be set aside. Normal 
contractual remedies for breach can then be pursued by any partner adversely affected by a 
wrongful termination. 
The other possible alternative argument, that the innocent party or parties could seek interim 
injunctions to prevent the offending partner or partners interfering in the firm's business until the 
application for dissolution can be dealt with, is similarly flawed. Ding that would merely impose 
additional cost and delay — without providing any obvious compensating benefit. 
There is one further, if allied, problem with Neuberger J’s concern. Unlike the situation when 
partnerships at will are dissolved by notice, and the validity of the dissolution is then challenged but 
upheld (when the dissolution can be backdated to the date of the notice182), when dissolution is 
ordered under s 35 it normally takes effect only from the date on which the decision is delivered.183 
While there are good reasons for this rule184 it means that the innocent partner(s) will remain liable 
for firm obligations incurred during the intervening period, and have no guarantee of indemnity.  
Conclusion 
The critical difference between the UK and Australian approaches is in their conflicting views about 
whether a distinction should be drawn between the contract of partnership and the partnership 
relationship — perhaps best encapsulated by Murphy JA’s statement in Fazio v Fazio that, ‘It seems to 
me with respect, that if, at law, the contract from which the relation ‘springs’ … has been validly 
terminated at law … it is difficult, at least prima facie to envisage that relationship subsisting’.185 
The Australian courts seem to have taken a more pragmatic approach, perhaps best expressed by 
Ipp JA in Ryder v Frohlich where he said ‘whatever technical labels one may choose — acceptance of 
repudiation, abandonment, agreement by conduct, unilateral act, or some other doctrine — 
common sense rebels against the notion that the appellants can now be permitted to assert that the 
partnership was not terminated as the judge found.’186 
In the end result, it may well be that Lord Millett’s views will be formally accepted, particularly in the 
UK, either in the form in which they were expressed or with some qualification, such as that which 
Southin JA appears to have applied in Brew v Rozano Holdings Ltd.187 However, in the absence of a 
detailed ‘adversarial argument’ in a dispute where the question is squarely in contention and the 
outcome depends entirely on the answer, that should not be presumed.  
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